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The Globalization of Antitrust Enforcement:
Governance Issues and Legal Responses
LucIo LANUCARA*
INTRODUCTION
In the age of the global village, economic fluctuations are increasingly
reaching beyond national borders, and so too is antitrust sensitive conduct by
multinational and transnational entities. In the last two decades, this has caused
increasing pressure on the limited resources of enforcement agencies, and has
made the unilateral exercise of sovereignty an inadequate means of policing
competition while avoiding trade wars and diplomatic friction.
Responses to the unresolved antitrust enforcement issues resulting from
globalization have developed on different governance and legal levels. A
conflict has developed between bilateral and multilateral approaches to
international antitrust enforcement, with antagonism both between and within
countries. A greater degree of convergence has emerged only with the new
millennium.
The United States and European Union (EU) models of antitrust law
contend with each other for dominance in the global arena. The United States
and the EU also spread their models in other jurisdictions through bilateral and
multilateral approaches to enforcement issues. The flourishing of bilateral
cooperation between antitrust agencies and the increased attention to
government-led multilateral approaches also highlight conflicts between
different modes of exercising sovereignty. How the increasing economic
pressure for satisfactory international solutions and the resulting governance
and legal issues combine will determine the shape of international antitrust
enforcement in the future.
In this paper, I will discuss the domestic reorganization of relationships
between central governments and autonomous enforcement authorities. Next, I
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will outline the increasingly sophisticated degree of transgovermnental
cooperation that has resulted from the globalization of economies. I will then
analyze outstanding political issues related to international antitrust
enforcement. I will conclude by considering the proposal for a multilateral
agreement from the World Trade Organization (WTO), the most promising
development in recent years for a multilateral approach to international antitrust
enforcement.
In order to reach these goals I will first describe, in Section I, the historical
and juridical background of antitrust transgovermmental cooperation. In
subsection I.a, I will consider the economic and political problems that have
brought most developed nation states to gradually embrace a transgovemnental
approach to certain antitrust issues. In subsections I.b and I.c, I will describe
the consequent spread of bilateral cooperation agreements and the initial
failures of multilateral approaches.
Section II will consist of a description of international antitrust enforcement
in light of recent developments in the modes of sovereignty exercised by states.
After describing general trends in the exercise of sovereignty in subsection ll.a,
I will consider in subsection I.b the domestic exercise of antitrust authority,
trans-governmental cooperation and the discussion within the WTO in light of
the tension between centralization and decentralized enforcement.
Section III will include a closer analysis of the domestic and international
political struggles influencing bilateral and multilateral approaches to
international antitrust enforcement. From the domestic point of view, I will
consider how the tension between the centralized and decentralized exercise of
sovereignty can produce inconsistent positions. From the international point of
view, I will analyze the rivalry between the U.S. and the EU antitrust models
for global dominance.
In Section IV, I will conclude by considering the merits of the proposal for
a multilateral agreement from the WTO, as recently discussed at the WTO
Ministerial Conference in Doha.
THE GLOBALIZATION OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
A. Development of Unilateral Approaches to International Antitrust
Enforcement
Until the 1980s, antitrust enforcement was perceived as an almost
exclusively domestic issue. For many years, the United States was the only
country with antitrust legislation and specialized authorities enforcing it.'
Emerging from the Second World War, Germany and Japan were forced to
adopt antitrust legislation. The winning alliance found it necessary to
disaggregate the concentration of economic powers that had supported
extremist nationalism in these two countries, leading to war. It was not until
1957 that a general competition system was introduced in Europe, with the
Treaty of Rome instituting the European Economic Community (EEC).2 While
EEC antitrust legislation was inspired by the American experience, the main
rationale for the adoption of competition rules was to favor integration and
harmonized development within the Common Market.3 Therefore, for a long
time the focus of European antitrust was not on external issues, but rather on
supporting the architecture of the Treaty of Rome.
As for the United States, the rare cases of antitrust issues trespassing across
national borders were dealt with by relying on the extraterritorial reach of
domestic legislation. The basis for such extraterritorial reach of U.S. law is
reflected in section 402 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law,
which applies the effects principle by including among the activities over which
a state has jurisdiction to prescribe "conduct outside its territory that has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory.
' 4
1. The Sherman Act was adopted in 1890, while Kansas already had an antitrust law in 1889. See 1889
Kan. Sess. Laws 389.
2. Treat,' Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter
Treaty of Rome]. Competition rules were contained in articles 85 [now 81] and 86 [now 82]. European
competition law also includes rules on state aids, necessary in order to reach the aim of Common Market
integration.
3. Id. These were the basic goals of the EEC, as stated in articles 2 and 3.
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402. Other conduct, identified by § 402 over which
the United States has jurisdiction includes: Conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within the
state's territory; the status of persons, or interests in things, present within the state's territory; activities,
interests, status, or relations of national as well as within the state's territory, and certain conduct outside the
state's territory by persons other than its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a
limited class of other state interests. Id.
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However infrequent, the extraterritorial exercise of sovereignty by U.S.
authorities, sanctioned by U.S. courts, was met by resistance from European
partners, especially France and the United Kingdom (U.K.). This resulted
initially in diplomatic protests and eventually in the adoption of blocking
statutes, the most relevant being the U.K. Protection of Trading Interests Act
1980, and in counteraction by foreign courts. 5 Eventually, the growing pressure
exercised by diplomatic protests and the counter effects of blocking statutes and
foreign court action made a response necessary. Thus, the U.S. courts, in the
1970s, began limiting the scope of extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law through the consideration of "comity" factors.6
During this time, third world countries lamenting unfair exploitation from
multinational companies and Western governments raised the international
relevance of anticompetitive practices. However, the lack of consensus even on
the definition of antitrust issues and the political weakness of third world
countries did not allow the adoption of any effective measures.
During the 1980s, European economies underwent consolidation through
the implementation of the Common Market. This created the means for the
extraterritorial extension of European antitrust enforcement through 1) the
adoption of the Merger Regulation (Council Regulation 4064/89),8 and 2) the
5. See Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in US and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L. J.
159, 160 (1999). Blocking statutes typically forbid a domestic investigated party to comply with the
requirements by the U.S. authorities. For more details, see A. V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interest Act, 1980,75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Lawrence
Collins, Blocking and Clawback Statutes: The U.K. Approach-I, 1986 J. BUS. L. 372 (1986); Lawrence
Collins, Blocking and Clawback Statutes: The U.K. Approach-l, 1986 J. Bus. L. 452 (1986);
6. Comity, in the field ofinternational law, can be defined as a general principle "aiming at balancing the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction with a readiness on behalf of the country enforcing its competition laws
to take into account the important interests of another country." Georgios Kiriazis, Positive Comity in EU/US
Cooperation in Competition Matters, COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL. (No. 3), Oct. 1998, at 11. Section 403 of
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law states, "[e]ven when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is
present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having
connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403.
7. See SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS (1998).
8. Council Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1; Corrigendum, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13. The
extraterritorial reach of the Merger Regulation showed its full potentials in the review by the Commission over
the Boeing/McDonnell Douglass merger, with Boeing being forced to pervasive undertakings to clear the
concentration.
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development of extra-jurisdictional anticartel enforcement by the European
Court of Justice. 9
The Merger Regulation contemplated for the Commission an analysis based
on the effects of a concentration within the Community, independently of the
location of the seat of the companies concerned. The extraterritorial reach of
the Merger Regulation has been aggressively implemented by the Commission,
leading to denial of clearance in some cases of great international relevance,
such as Gencor (in 1996, confirmed by the Court of First Instance in 1999),0
MCI WorldCom/Sprint (in 2000),' and GE-Honeywell (in 2001). 12
As for anti-cartel enforcement, jurisdiction over international cartels was
clearly established in Woodpulp,1 3 in which the European Court of Justice held
that jurisdiction under Article 85 [now article 81] exists over non-European
firms outside the European Community if they implement an anticompetitive
agreement reached outside the European Community by selling their products
to purchasers inside the European Community. The Commission had found in
that case that various Scandinavian bleached sulfate woodpulp producers had
engaged in a cartel sale of their products in the European Community.
Shipments to the European Community effected by the cartel amounted to two-
thirds of total shipment of the product to the European Community and sixty
percent of EC consumption. The case, based on an "implementation doctrine,"
rather than on an "effects doctrine," left doubts as to whether-absent any
marketing organization within the EC-foreign cartels selling directly to EC
customers would fall within EC jurisdiction. 14 However, the applicability of a
9. This possibility was first developed with the decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1988
in the Woodpulp case. Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, Ahlstr6m Osakeyhtio &
Others v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 [hereinafter Woodpulp].
10. Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 971 (1999).
11. Case COMP/M.1741-MCI, MCI/WorldCom v. Sprint, 2000 O.J. (C143) 4, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comn/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/ml741_en.pdf. WorldCom appealed the
decision on September 27, 2000 and the case is still pending. Case T-3 10/00, WorldCom v. Commission of
the European Communities, 2000 O.J. (C355) 35.
12. Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric v. Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C331) 24, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_.en.pdf.
13. Woodpulp, supra, note 9. Before Woodpulp, a first step toward application of European competition
law to international cartels had been set with the adoption of the "group economic unit" doctrine, in Case
48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 619, where it was decided that the
conduct of a subsidiary active in the EC is attributed for antitrust purposes to the parent company seated
outside the EC but exercising its corporate control on the subsidiary.
14. See Georgios Kiriazis, Jurisdiction and Cooperation Issues in the Investigation of International
Cartels, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp200l010_en.pdf (last visited May 1,
2002).
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pure "effects doctrine" to cartel cases under EU law has recently been affirmed
by the EU Court of First Instance in the Gencor case.' 5 The Court, while
upholding application of the "implementation doctrine" by the Commission
under the Merger Regulation, also specified that "According to Woodpulp, the
criterion as to the implementation of an agreement is satisfied by mere sale
within the Community, irrespective of the location of the sources of supply and
the production plant'
16
B. Reasons for the Increasing Importance of International Antitrust
Enforcement
During the last twenty years, international antitrust enforcement has
become a more important element in the efficient policing of markets and
international trade. Three factors have been particularly important: the
globalization of economies, the proliferation of new antitrust legislation, and
the liberalization of trade.
Globalization has been defined in many ways. Most scholars agree that it is
characterized by an economic process that increasingly made action by single
states insufficient to address development of economies. This process grew
rapidly during the 1980s and dominated the international scene by the 1990s.17
This resulted in an increase in the number and dimension of transnational
practices by multinational corporations, making the limitations of traditional
approaches more evident.'" The proliferation of antitrust legislation has
increased the probability that the practices of major corporations will fall under
15. Gencor, supra note 10.
16. Id, at para. 87.
17. Globalization causes severe tensions to traditional nation states. Mainly, it has caused upward
pressures toward macro-markets and downward pressure toward micro-ethnicity. Technology is the dominant
factor in this process, as it determined deeper interdependence between countries and a dramatic growth of
international operations by large corporations. See P. S. MISTRY, REGIONAL INTEGRATION ARRANGEMENTS
IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT-PANACEA OR PITFALL? 12 (1996); "Who Is Us? "-National Interests in an
Age of Global Industry: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 10 1st Cong. 72-85 (1990)
(statement of Gerald P. Dinneen, Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Engineering).
18. As recently noticed in A. Douglas Melamed, International Antitrust in an Age of International
Deregulation, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 437, 438 (1998), while economies have become global, the same has
not been possible for the states. Thus, neither a binding international antitrust code or an international set of
jurisdictional and procedural rules have been developed. The only means to address antitrust issues
internationally, according to Mr. Melamed, remain either unilateral approaches or bilateral agreements of
voluntary cooperation.
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the scrutiny of several antitrust authorities.' 9 The possibility of conflicting
decisions and of greater costs for both corporations and public authorities is
therefore on the rise.20  The development and liberalization of international
trade achieved by lowering tariffs and prohibiting other means of excluding
foreign competitors has greatly increased the relevance of international
activities. 21 Finally, the adoption of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has
further encouraged transnational transactions.22
As a result of these developments, many transactions and mergers have a
substantial transnational effect even when they are conducted by subjects
whose seat is in a single market. Such activities could become objects of
scrutiny by two or more competition authorities. The multiple and possibly
contrasting reviews by antitrust authorities, the impracticality of purely
unilateral approaches, and the limitation on international trade caused by
distorted applications of antitrust principles have caused a shift in interest
19. This problem is particularly evident for merger control cases, as several authorities need to be notified
for even minor operations. For instance, in my practice at Freshfields Bruckaus Deringer, I recently dealt with
an acquisition, in a side market to mobile telecommunications services. The transaction required, for an
acquired activity with a worldwide turnover of less then $50 million, notifications to the antitrust authorities of
the United States, Brazil, Italy, Germany, and Greece. For larger transactions, dozens of antitrust authorities
might have jurisdiction.
20. By the end of 1998, 81 countries had an antitrust law. Survey: World Trade: Commerce and
Contestability, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at 14. The number grew to approximately 90 countries as of
January 2001, while another 20 are in the process of drafting them. Barry A. Pupkin, The Internationalization
of Antitrust Law and the Increased Convergence of US and EU Antitrust Law (Jan. 16, 2001),
http://www.ssd.com/library/pdf/pupkin.pdf. If we consider that antitrust laws were in force only in 28
countries at the end of the 1980s, we could easily realize what a great spur of legislation occurred in only a
few years. See Mark R. A. Palim, The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical Analysis,
ANTITRUST BULL., Mar. 22, 1998, at 105. The main reasons for the developments of the last decade are the
opening of Eastern Europe to the European Union, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reshaping of
economic strategies from protectionist to efficiency of the markets--in third world countries. See Karel Van
Miert, Competition Policy in Relation to the Central and Eastern European Countries, COMPETITION POL'Y
NEWSL., June 1998, at 1; SELL, supra note 7, at 175-216.
21. The level of tariffs, after diminishing from an average of 52% in 1934 to an average of 12.8% in 1952,
continued diminishing in the following rounds ofnegotiations. In the Uruguay Rounds, tariffs diminished by
a further 38% in developed countries and 24% in developing countries. Moreover, GATT tariff agreements
presently cover 98% of goods in developed countries.
22. NAFTA in North America and Mercosur in South America are the most successful recent RTAs.
However, since the early 1990s, the spur of RTAs have been robust, with 33 RTAs created in the period 1990-
1994. See JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCKS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM 4 (Inst.
for Int'l Econ. 1997). According to informal WTO sources, 50 more RTAs have been sent to the
GATT/WTO as of August 1998. Most of those agreements, unlike the RTAs adopted in the early
independence of the former European colonies, are based on development of trade, efficiency, and foreign
investment and normally are part of strategies of trade liberalization from individual countries. Therefore,
they contribute to the increase of transnational commercial operations. See A. S. BHALLA & P. BHALLA,
REGIONAL BLOCKS 17 (1997).
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toward bilateral and multilateral approaches to international antitrust issues. A
strictly unilateral approach is neither economically or politically viable in the
present political, economic, and social environment.
C. Alternatives to the Unilateral Approach to International Antitrust
Enforcement
The above-described conditions made it necessary to limit friction over
extraterritoriality issues and to improve efficient and timely international
enforcement of antitrust laws. This situation favored the adoption of bilateral
cooperation agreements in the 1980s and 1990s. While a cooperation
agreement between the United States and Germany was entered into as early as
1976,23 new arrangements were added with the U.S.-Australia agreement of
1982, the U.S.-Canada agreements of 1984, and the Australia-New Zealand
Closer Economic Relations Agreement of 1983 .24
During the 1990s, international approaches to antitrust intensified and
developed in two directions: the bilateral and the multilateral approach. The
bilateral approach was strengthened with the adoption of new agreements,
beginning with the EU-U.S. agreement of 1991. The latter inspired the
agreements between the United States and Canada (1995), the United States
and Australia (1997), The European Union and the United States (1998,
adopting positive comity), the United States and Israel (1999), EU and Canada
(1999), the United States and Japan (1999), the United States and Brazil
(1999), and the United States and Mexico (2000).25 In 2001, Denmark,
Iceland, and Norway also entered into an antitrust cooperation agreement.26
The main items that characterize the recent wave of antitrust cooperation
agreements are consultation and cooperation, the exchange of nonconfidential
information, traditional comity, and positive comity. The procedures and
23. The adoption of such an early agreement should be linked to the effort, after the Second World War, to
induce adoption of antitrust principles in Germany as a measure to prevent the recurrence of the powerful
cartels that supported the militarisation of Germany in the first half of the century.
24. See Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23,
1976, 15 I.L.M. 1282; Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 702;
Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the
Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9 1984, 23 I.L.M. 275.
25. For the texts of those agreements, see European Commission,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/intemationa/bilateral; Department of Justice,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/intemational/int_arrangements.htm.
26. Agreement between Denmark, Iceland and Norway on Cooperation in Competition Cases, Mar. 16,
2001.
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content for cooperation and consultation have been clearly defined since the
1991 EU-U.S. agreement, 27 while rules for the exchange of non-confidential
information were introduced in the 1976 U.S.-Germany agreement.28 While
traditional comity developed in other areas of law as well, 29 the most distinctive
feature of recent antitrust cooperation agreements is positive comity, which was
first introduced in the 1991 EU-U.S. agreement.3° Positive comity allows one
party to require the other party to take action against behaviors enacted in the
territory of the requested party that violate the important interests of the
requesting country, as well as the competition law of the requested party.
3 1
While bilateral cooperation flourished, few or no results were achieved by
multilateral approaches to antitrust law enforcement. The interaction between
trade and antitrust has been an object of study and research by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since the
late 1970s. In 1980, UNCTAD, after lengthy negotiations between developed
and developing countries, approved a Code of MultilaterallyAgreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices.
However, the Code, for various political reasons and because it is a nonbinding
recommendation, had no relevant impact on the development of antitrust laws
and policies for many years.32
27. Consultation and cooperation are at the core of the agreements. Since the EU-U.S. agreement of 1991,
it has clearly defined in regard to notification, exchange of information, and actual enforcement activities.
Today, it is widely recognized that cooperation fostered by the existing bilateral agreements has produced
positive results.
28. Since the 1976 U.S.-Germany Agreement, exchange of general information has always been present in
cooperation agreement. All agreements routinely include annual or biannual informative meetings.
29. Traditional comity procedures requested the authorities of one party to take into account the important
interests of the other party when exercising theirjurisdiction. This practice, after having developed in various
areas of law, particularly in common law countries, has been considerably limited by the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Hartford Fire v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993), that established very strict boundaries for
the application of comity principles in the United States. For a detailed discussion of the environment
determined by this decision, see Spencer Weber Waller, From the Ashes ofHartfordFire: The Unanswered
Questions of Comity, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 33, 39-51
(1998).
30. The agreement between Iceland, Norway, and Denmark, which was developed independent of the EU-
U.S. experience, does not include a specific positive comity clause.
31. Positive comity has been praised in both U.S. and EU reports on cooperation in antitrust enforcement
as essential for any further development of bilateral cooperation.
32. See SELL, supra note 7. From the political point of view, one of the main reasons for the practical
failure of the Code was the disagreement between developed and developing countries over the relevance of
freedom of markets for the development of welfare. It is worth noting, however, that this document already
mentioned the aim that restrictive business practices "do not impede or negate the realization of benefits that
should arise from the liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting world trade, particularly those
20021
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The OECD produced its first significant document in 1978. 33 In the 1984
report, Competition and Trade Policy-Their Interaction, both anticompetitive
practices that affect international trade and competition-related trade issues
were thoroughly analyzed for the first time.3  In the 1990s, the OECD
intensified its study and promotion of antitrust harmonization.35 The most
relevant documents, which frame the international discussion of such issues,
are: the Recommendation of the Council for Cooperation between Member
Countries in Areas of Potential Conflicts between Competition and Trade
Policies, adopted in 1986 and revised in 1995,36 and the 1998 Recommendation
of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Cartels.37 Finally,
the OECD also furthered the understanding of such complex issues through the
publication of collections of studies by independent scholars.
The work produced by the OECD since the 1970s modeled international
views of those issues. Therefore, it is not surprising that the. activity of the
WTO Working Group on Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy is
now widely inspired by many of the positions developed by the OECD in the
past two decades.
38
affecting the trade and development of developing countries." Working Group on the Interaction between
Trade & Competition Pol'y, Communication from UNCTAD, (July 4, 1997), at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen viewerwindow.asp?d:/ddfdocuments/twt/wgtcp/w 17.wpf.htm.
33. OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Action Against Restrictive Business Practices
Affecting International Trade Including those Involving Multinational Enterprises, C(78)133/Final (1978).
34. OECD COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (CLP), COMPETITION AND
TRADE POLICIES-THEIR INTERACTION (1984), available at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/clp/Publications/COMPTRA.pdf. The report stressed that further action was
needed to improve international cooperation on such issues and indicated an intention to further develop
policy approaches and recommendations, particularly in those areas where conflicts are more likely between
trade and competition policies and practices of Member States.
35. The most relevant writings in this decade are: Interim Report of the C.L.P. on Convergence of
Competition Policy (OECD/GD(94)64(1994)); Joint Reports of the C.L.P. and of the Group on Trade and
Competition of 1993 and 1994 (OECD/GD(93)!01(1993), OECD/GD(94)63(1994)); Report Strengthening
the Coherence Between Trade and Competition Policy (OECD/GD(96)90(1996)).
36. See C(86)65(Final); C(95)130/Final.
37. C(98)35/Final. The OECD also aims at furthering the effects of the 1998 Recommendation by inviting
non-OECD Member States to associate themselves with the recommendation and to implement it. See
Statement on the Association by Non-members with the OECD Council Recommendation on Effective Action
Against Hard Core Cartels, http://www.oecd.org/pdfMOOOI 8000/M00018615.pdf (last visited May 1,2002).
38. See Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication From
OECD, Doc. WT/WGTCP/W/21, at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_viewerwindow.asp?
d:/ddfdocuments/t/wtfwgtcp/w21.wpf.htm. The areas of study by the OECD that have been particularly
relevant for the activity of the WTO Working Group regard: (1). the definition of the field of application and
effective application of antitrust law, the possibility of finding common principles and of implementing
convergence of different antitrust laws; (2). market contestability at the international level and cooperation in
2002] THE GLOBALIZATION OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 443
The WTO Working Group was established in 1996 as a result of a proposal
by the European Commission. After a preliminary report in 1997, the Working
Group continued analyzing interaction between trade and competition policies.
Also, as a consequence of the Working Group's reports, the discussion of
antitrust issues has become part of the platform for the next round of WTO
negotiations.39
11. ANTITRUST COOPERATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
A. Recent Trends in the Modes of Sovereignty Exercised by States
As discussed in the previous section of this paper, due to fast economic
transformations, international approaches to antitrust have accelerated greatly in
the last decade. This made the inefficiency of the traditional national
approaches to antitrust enforcement more evident. However, globalization also
had a wider impact on the organization of states. The limitations of centralized
exercise of sovereignty in dealing with an economic scenario in continuous
transformation have become increasingly evident. Some scholars have
concluded that, due to the internationalization of economic and social activity,
the traditional concept of sovereignty based on exclusive territorial jurisdiction
is no longer functional. 40 A reaction by states has been to decentralize the
exercise of sovereignty, particularly in fields such as antitrust, in which the
complex economic environment is coupled with peculiarities that require the
involvement of specifically qualified officers and agencies. Sol Picciotto has
interpreted this as a process of "fragmentation" of states. 41 What is certain is
the application of antitrust laws; and (3). more specific issues, such as international cartels, multi-
jurisdictional mergers in the automotive industry, and the reform of regulations.
39. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration, Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Ministerial Conference, Nov. 20,
2002), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist_e/minOl_e/mindecle.pdf [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
The Working Group, after its Preliminary Report and Program in 1997, produced three Reports on the
interaction between trade and competition policy in December 1998, October 1999, and November 2000:
Doc. WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998); Doc. WT/WGTCP/3 (Oct. 11, 1999); Doc. WT/WGTCP/4 (Nov. 30,
2000). The failure of the Seattle Conference also slowed down the discussion on the relation between antitrust
and trade in the Millennium Round. However, at the Doha Conference in November 2001, governments
agreed in principle that a framework for competition rules within WTO should be negotiated after the next
Ministerial Conference in 2003.
40. See John Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47
INT'L ORG. 139, 174 (1993).
4 1. See S. Picciotto, The Regulatory Criss-cross: Interaction Between Jurisdictions and the Construction
of Global Regulatory Networks, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION:
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that the traditional organization and hierarchies of public power have been
under pressure both externally, through the institution and implementation of
inter-governmental organizations, and internally, through the development of
decentralized networks and the cooperative exercise of sovereignty.
From the point of view of intergovernmental organizations, efforts have
steadily increased, following the Second World War, to create and expand the
power of regional or global supranational organizations. The United Nations,
the Council of Europe, the European Community, and the World Trade
Organization are such examples. From the point of view of internal modes of
exercising sovereignty, there have been pressures to delegate sovereignty.
These pressures have been interpreted as a force driving the shift of power from
hierarchies to networks and from centralized compulsion to voluntary
association.43
Intergovernmental approaches to sovereignty have not significantly affected
the exercise of sovereignty. The main reason is that organizations like the
United Nations cannot work effectively independent of their member
governments, and governments are not willing to cede their power and
sovereignty to an international institution without exercising close control over
it.44 Even in cases of apparent success with a new form of sovereignty, such as
the European Union, the outcome is rather a reorganization and reaggregation,
at a federalist level, of the traditional concept of sovereignty of nation states. 45
The internal exercise of sovereignty in most developed countries has
undergone dynamic developments. As noted by Jessica T. Mathews, a number
of centers of power-both sub-state and non-state actors-have emerged or
PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 89,92-98 (William Bratton
et al. eds., 1996).
42. See J. H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 278-88
(1995). The foundation of the present international regulation of economic relations consists of a group of
institutions and multilateral international agreements known as the Bretton Woods System. The main
institutions comprising this system are: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and the WTO/GATT organization.
43. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997).
44. See id. at 191.
45. Jayasuriya disagrees with those scholars that consider the European Union the most evident success of
a new "fragmented" model of sovereignty. See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the
Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 425 (1999) (citing Neil McCormik, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REv. 1, 8 (1993)). The
European Union should not be considered the result of a new form of sovereignty, but rather a new process to
reach a "classical" result (federalism). This process will be proven by the many fields, including the economic
policy and, soon, the military organization, in which the European Union is adopting a centralized system in
line with federalist models.
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have strengthened their position.4 Non-state actors have gained power in the
new scenario, as is shown by the rise and gradual recognition of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).47 More interesting for the scope of this
paper is the role of sub-state actors, particularly independent authorities. The
development of decentralized and multiform centers, favored within states as a
response to the insufficiencies of centralized actions, has determined the
internationalization of a number of agencies operating in complex and highly
specialized areas of law and economics. The interaction between those
internationalized agencies has taken the form of what Anne-Marie Slaughter
has called "regulatory webs." 48 Such "webs" operate at a somewhat different
level than traditional international law. In international law, states formally
assume their obligations through treaties that oblige them to modify their
internal legislation. In Slaughter's view, this kind of international legislation
tends not to directly overlap with domestic legislation because national
legislatures do not usually seek to regulate global common issues and interstate
relations. On the other hand, transgovernmental relations within regulatory
webs affect issues already regulated internally by each state. Issues such as
crime, securities fraud, anticompetitive practices, and pollution 9 are addressed
through national agencies entering arrangements contained generally in
informal, nonbinding memoranda of understandings or agreements. 50 Kanishka
46. Mathews interprets these processes as sovereignty transformations driven by information technology,
with the radically expanded communications capacity empowering individuals and groups and diminishing
traditional authority. See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50 (1997).
47. NGOs have been able to produce a particularly relevant impact thanks to the globalization of
technology and information. In fact, both access to information and organization and sharing of information
and actions have become independent from major structures. The most relevant success ofNGOs have been
realized with the events related to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAD), which the OECD had
discussed for a long time before entering a stalemate. During negotiations for MAI, it was mainly the
criticism and actions from NGOs, combined with worries of trade unions, intellectuals, and political
representatives, that caused France to withdraw from negotiations, thereby "killing" the agreement. For some
of the criticisms to MAI by NGOs, see William Crane, Corporations Swallowing Nations: The OECD and
the MultilateralAgreement on Investment, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 429 (1998). For a description
of events in France related to MAI, see C. De Brie, Vers une Mondialisation de la Resistance, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Dec. 21, 1998; J. C. Lefort & J. P. Page, Double Jeu Autour de lAMI, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Oct. 12, 1998.
48. Anne-Marie Slaughter remarked, "The densest area of trans-govemmental activity is among national
regulators. Bureaucrats charged with the administration of antitrust policy, securities regulation,
environmental policy, criminal law enforcement, banking and insurance supervision-in short, all the agents
of the modem regulatory state--regularly collaborate with their foreign counterparts." Slaughter, supra note
43, at 190.
49. Id. at 191.
50. Memoranda and agreements are widely used in the field of antitrust. In the banking field, the most
relevant means of cooperation is the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Committee), an organization
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Jayasuriya considers this procedure to be a result of globalization. She notes
that progress in technology and transportation, which favors globalization, has
also made it harder to enforce national law; the pace of transformation is too
fast to allow legislatures to effectively tackle new problems. Innovative and
more flexible approaches are thus necessary."'
The interpretation of the decentralized actions by public authorities has
been varied. The scholars who support a "new medievalist '' 52 approach
consider the international action of domestic agencies to be part of a wider
process of power shifting from hierarchies to networks. The rise of these
networks would result in global governance being controlled by private
interests and nongovernmental bodies, and in the substantive death of the
nation state.53
A more recent interpretation has been that, while the central role of
globalization through technology has deeply affected the structure of
sovereignty, this has not caused a disaggregation of the traditional sovereignty
of nation states in favor of networks and individuals. Instead, a reorganization
and fragmentation of the centers of exercise of state sovereignty has occurred.54
According to this interpretation, the real revolution would consist not of a loss
of the concept of sovereignty, but of a replacement of the traditional
centralization of power, which has been the dominant model since the
Eighteenth Century, with polycentric modes of power, still within a traditional
state-oriented model of sovereignty.
composed of 12 central bank governors. The Committee was created as a result of an agreement among the
governors themselves. It meets 4 times a year and follows its own rules. Although its decisions are
unanimous and not formally binding, they are actually implemented so that action by the governors within the
Committee might be considered an effective form of exercise of sovereignty. Id at 190.
51. As previously mentioned, current technological and economic development is such that, in order to
overcome the incongruity of the centralized state and solve internationalized problems, agencies must develop
a high degree of autonomy and independence within the state. At the same time, states must provide those
agencies with wide autonomy in order to operate effectively in an internationalized scenario. According to
some scholars, this condition creates a necessary fragmentation of the domestic organization of the state. See,
e.g., Jayasuriya, supra note 45, at 438-40. Agencies use their independence to create international practices,
while still operating only formally within a framework of national regulations. See id.
52. Matthews, supra note 46. Other commentators have, to differing degrees followed similar
interpretations of the new form of exercise of sovereignty as a process of crisis, rather than transformation of
state sovereignty.
53. Id. Other commentators have, to different degrees followed a similar interpretation of the new form of
exercise of sovereignty as a process of crisis, rather than transformation of state sovereignty.
54. Globalization is constantly transforming the traditional concepts of sovereignty, so much that many
individuals today believe that the traditional concept of sovereignty, identified by exclusive territorial
jurisdiction is no longer serviceable given the new economic and social scenarios. See Ruggie, supra note 40,
at 174.
2002] THE GLOBALIZATION OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 447
Scholars following this view generally conclude by noting that the global
governance of the economy imposed by technology requires the
internationalization of state agencies and institutions, and that this result can be
achieved only by granting to those institutions a degree of autonomy from other
state institutions. Thus, the fragmentation of the state is seen as a form in
which state sovereignty has developed in order to deal with a global economy.5
While these analyses usefully highlight certain political and institutional
developments, it might be excessive, at least at this stage, to talk about an actual
fragmentation of states. Agencies remain accountable directly or indirectly to
governments that appoint their chiefs (and often can remove them at any time)
and to parliaments with whose laws they must abide. While agencies operate in
an increasingly autonomous mode, central governments and parliaments
maintain their hierarchical power and can regain possession of or redistribute
competences with respect to the exercise of sovereignty. The survival of a
traditional set of hierarchies can be demonstrated both in the EU and in the
United States. In the EU, the cooperation agreement entered in 1990 with U.S.
antitrust agencies was initially struck down by the European Court of Justice
based on the fact that it was signed only by the European Commission, thus
usurping the powers of the Council, i.e. of the Member States governments that
form it.56 This demonstrates that the final decision-making power remains
firmly in the hands of governments, no matter how much autonomy the
European Commission is allowed in its action. In the United States, in order to
allow deeper cooperation with foreign antitrust authorities, it was necessary to
adopt the 1994 International Antitrust Enforcement Act. The Act authorized
antitrust agencies to enter directly into cooperation agreements derogating from
domestic laws in fields including the exchange of confidential information.
Thus, absent an explicit delegation of powers by the Government or the
Congress, U.S. antitrust agencies cannot independently extend their action
beyond specified limits.
Even with these limitations, the power delegated to agencies is being
exercised in an increasingly independent fashion. Thus, the more such bodies
are conferred a degree of autonomy from the political powers, the more their
55. See Jayasuriya, supra note 45, at 439.
56. Case C-327/91, French Republic v. Comm'n of the European Communities, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641. Fora
comment on the decision, see Christine Kaddous, L 'arr&t France C. Commission de 1994 (Accord
Concurrence) et le Contrdle de la "'Ldgaliti "des Accords Externes en Vertu deL 'art 173 CE: La Dfficile
Riconciliation de L 'orthodoxie Communautaire avec L 'orthodoxie Internationale, 5-6 CAHIERS DE DROIT
EUROPtEN 613, 617 (1996).
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action and policy can diverge from the political guidance of the country and, in
some circumstances, might come to shape the foreign policy. This can be the
case when the expansion of the action from sub-government bodies is a result
of loopholes or the nonexercise of function by other traditional powers. 7
B. The Case of Antitrust Enforcement
Whether the present modes of exercise of sovereignty through specialized
agencies constitute a disaggregation, a fragmentation, or a simple
decentralization of sovereignty, the adoption and implementation of bilateral
antitrust cooperation at the international level are best understood if one
considers the question in light of governance issues. It is not surprising that
decentralization and internationalization have been relevant in highly
specialized areas of law, such as antitrust, in which the specialized enforcement
agencies are normally the only bodies equipped with the necessary knowledge
and contacts to deal efficiently with issues of global governance. In antitrust
enforcement, the necessity to utilize new tools for enforcement has been further
heightened by the well-recognized insufficiencies of the previous unilateral
approaches and by the growing possibility of jurisdictional conflicts and
confusion. 58 The adoption of bilateral cooperation agreements should thus be
seen as an example of the general reorganization of sovereignty undertaken by
states in order to cope with new economic, juridical, and political pressures.
Antitrust agencies have led the way in resolving international antitrust issues,
providing an answer to the inadequacy of national antitrust laws as applied
directly to transnational issues.
Since the second half of the 1990s, an alternative approach arose from
discussion within the WTO that might allow the traditional model of
centralized sovereignty to regain its predominant position. Based on an
initiative of the European Commission,59 a Study Group was established in
57. One example was the action of state antitrust regulators in the United States during the Reagan
administration, when the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defacto relinquished the exercise of
their powers in full application of neo-liberalist theories. Likewise, in the early 1990s in Italy, the action of the
Judiciary branch (which in Italy is fully independent from the political process) substantially wiped out a
corrupt generation of political leaders and, for some time, acquired a defacto political function and investiture
from the people.
58. Cfr. supra Part 1.
59. The European Commission proposed the institution of the Working Group on the Interaction between
Trade and Competition (Working Group) at the 1996 Singapore Interministerial Conference. See Press
Release, WTO News, World Trade Organization: Ministerial Conference, Singapore, 9-13 Dec. 1996 (Dec.
18, 1996), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres96_e/wtodec.htm. The Commission's proposal was
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1996 to investigate the interplay between antitrust and international trade.
Since the establishment of this Group, it has been clear that the aim of the
proposal is to promote the adoption of rules on antitrust laws and procedures in
the WTO arena. 60 Finally, WTO members recently agreed at Doha to begin
negotiations for a multilateral framework of antitrust rules in 2003.61 In light of
the fact that the WTO is an organization of governments, requiring consensus
in order to adopt any rules, it is clear that this new scenario will permit
governments to regain direct control over the exercise of jurisdiction in
international antitrust matters.
As a result of these developments, and considering the continued expansion
62
of cooperation agreements, international antitrust is now being addressed both
at a bilateral and at a multilateral level. This highlights potential conflicts
between different visions and modes of sovereignty.
Once the inadequacy of unilateral solutions became evident, the approach
to international antitrust was based on bilateral agreements regulating substate
level relations between specialized agencies. This approach is in line with the
general reorganization of the modes of exercising sovereignty within states.
The adoption of nonbinding bilateral agreements has the primary function of
formally recognizing a practice that has been developing through a network of
relationships and cooperation for a long time. However, the action of agencies
is increasingly being balanced by the direct action of governments. The
initiative within the WTO will enhance government actions, after the unfruitful
attempts of the past.63  New WTO rules will be directly negotiated by the
approved and the Working Group began its work the following year. The aim of the Working Group was to
study the interaction between trade and antitrust and propose its conclusions and recommendations to the
WTO.
60. The European Commission, in its press releases after the adoption of the proposal and in its
Commissioners' subsequent speeches, has always mentioned that the work of the Working Group is
exploratory and should prepare the ground for negotiations on a binding framework of rules. Id,
6 1. The main areas for negotiations will be: Core principles, such as transparency, non-discrimination and
procedural fairness, and provisions on hard-core cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for
progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through skills building. For the
text of the Doha Declaration, see Doha Declaration, supra note 39.
62. As noted earlier in this paper, the DOJ and the FrC entered agreements with Israel, Japan, and Brazil
in 1999, and Mexico in 2000, while the EU entered into an agreement with Canada and is discussing further
cooperation with Japan. In 2001, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark also entered into a cooperation agreement.
63. UNCTAD and the OECD have been studying and conducting research on the interaction between trade
and antitrust since the late 1970s, some time before the subject became a central issue of discussion within the
WTO. In 1980, UNCTAD, after lengthy negotiations between developed and developing countries, approved
the Code of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices. See UNCTAD, Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices (1980), available at
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governments and, when implemented, will lead to changes in state regulation,
thus allowing governments to regain full control of the development of
international antitrust enforcement in a way that would limit both the delegation
of sovereignty to independent authorities and the diplomatic difficulties of the
past. From the juridical point of view, while bilateral agreements are aimed at
formalizing a system of voluntary cooperation among agencies, the aim of the
WTO negotiations is to adopt a system of binding rules that the states would
then implement in their legal systems.64 Since sub-governmental bodies expand
their action in the absence of efficient state action, a retreat from the concrete
exercise of sovereignty by national antitrust authorities should be expected as
an effect of a WTO action.
III. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES UNDERLYING
THE BILATERAL AND THE MULTILATERAL APPROACHES
A. Complementarity between the Bilateral and the Multilateral
Approaches
Bilateral cooperation of independent agencies and the adoption of
multilateral rules by states are complementary. Their combination can allow
states to tackle both short- and long-term problems in international antitrust
enforcement. In the long term, a solely multilateral approach has more
potential successfully to address multijurisdictional issues. In the present,
increasingly globalized environment, competition policies of several countries
http://www.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/docs/CPSet/cpsetp4.htm [hereinafter Code]. The document, for a
series of political reasons and because it is a non-binding document, for many years did not have any relevant
impact on the development of antitrust law and policy. See SELL, supra note 7. It is noteworthy, however,
how even at that earlier time, the provisions of the code were aimed at ensuring that restrictive business
practices did "not impede or negate the realization of benefits that should arise from the liberalization of tariff
and non-tariff barriers affecting world trade, particularly those affecting the trade and development of
developing countries." Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy,
Communication from UNCTAD, Doc. WT/WGTCP/W/17 (July 4, 1997).
64, According to the European Commission, the establishment of a WTO framework on competition
should focus on the development of core principles and rules on domestic competition law and its
enforcement. In the vision of the Commission, particular attention should be dedicated to the principles of
competition law and policy that have a more relevant impact on the international trading environment, while
fully recognizing the peculiarity of each domestic legal and institutional framework. The WTO principles of
transparency and non-discrimination would provide key foundations for the development of such core
principles and rules. For a more specific outline of the Commission's position, see Communication between
the EC and Its Member States: A WTO Competition Agreement and Development (2001),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/wto-comp07.pdf
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are ever more likely to be involved; thus, bilateral approaches can rapidly
become obsolete. Therefore, avoiding incoherence between different systems
might become harder if those systems are not harmonized. 65 At this point in
time, however, multilateral solutions might be either ineffective, like the 1980
Code, 66 or very complex and therefore only long-term solutions, like the WTO
approach or the proposals for a world competition authority. 67 These solutions
will take time before producing appreciable effects and thus should continue to
coexist with the already workable bilateral and regional solutions. For this
reason, bilateral cooperation agreements still represent a necessary element of
international antitrust enforcement.
The ideal solution is a parallel development of both approaches. However,
for many years the policies publicly followed by the two main players, the EU
and the United States, and within them by different authorities, have diverged.
In the early 1990s, the United States and the EU, through the initiative of the
1991 cooperation agreement, had placed the issue of antitrust cooperation at the
center of the international scene. Conversely, in the second half of the 1990s,
the European Commission and its American counterparts (the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)) diverged in their
views regarding the next step of antitrust cooperation. The Antitrust Division
of the DOJ, in particular, repeatedly expressed the view that it was useless or
even harmful to adopt general international antitrust principles, 68 while it was
65. The case of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger provided a clear example ofhow different antitrust
philosophies can cause friction, particularly when coupled with the reciprocal suspect of following the so-
called policy of the "national champion." In the recent GE-Honeywell case, the sharply differing outcome of
the merger review in the U.S. and in the EU (with the Commission blocking the merger) caused tension and
suspicions that national interests were being pursued against foreign companies through extraterritorial
application of competition law.
66. Code, supra note 63; see SELL, supra note 7.
67. A number of scholars have advocated the institution of a world competition authority. Generally, they
have followed three approaches: (1) the comprehensive approach, which includes the adoption of an
internationally binding set of rules and possibly an international authority; (2) the targeted approach, which is
based on a building-block theory and is aimed at developing international antitrust law by specific intervention
and gradual expansion, including bilateral and regional agreements; and (3) the solely national approach,
which has showed its obsolescence. See Elinore M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO:
Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 34 (1995).
68. See A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Enforcement in a Global Economy, Address Before the Fordham
Corporate Law Institute 25th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 22, 1998), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2043.htm (at the time of the speech Mr. Melamed was the Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division for the DOJ). Recently, after release of the final report
by the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee in February 2000, the DOJ demonstrated an
increased interest in the multilateral approach.
452 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 9:433
necessary to further improve bilateral agreements.69 Consistent with this view
was the adoption of the International Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1994, which
broadened U.S. antitrust authorities' power to enter agreements with foreign
authorities. This included the power to agree on exchange of confidential
information. The European Commission expressed reservations about the idea
of adopting more substantive bilateral agreements, while strongly advocating
discussion within the WTO. 70 United States authorities, after the release of the
final report from International Competition Policy Advisory Committee
(ICPAC) to the Attorney General in 2000, demonstrated increased interest in a
multilateral approach. At the same time, the wave of new bilateral agreements
between the United States and foreign antitrust authorities stopped. At the end
of 2001, the first concrete multilateral result was achieved with the launching of
the Global Forum within the OECD. Consensus was finally reached at Doha,
in November 2001, on negotiating a framework for competition rules within the
WTO after the next Ministerial Conference in 2003.
B. The U.S. and the EU Models ofAntitrust Law
In order to understand the evolution of the U.S. and EU positions on
international antitrust enforcement, it is necessary to analyze the political and
historical background of the debate. The United States' prolonged skepticism
may have stemmed from doubts about the efficiency of the WTO in addressing
competition-related issues, particularly after the outcome of the WTO litigation
between the United States and Japan in the so-called Kodak-Fuji disputes.7' In
69. Melamed, see id, in his speech noted that, while the attempt to adopt international binding principles
would have been harmful, bilateral cooperation had demonstrated very useful and thus the DOJ would have
continued to make negotiation of new, appropriately-tailored bilateral cooperation agreements a priority.
70. See Karel Van Miert, Transatlantic Relations and Competition Policy, 2 EC COMPETITION POL'Y
NEWSL., Autumn 1996 (Speech Given at the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, Nov. 26, 1996),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp 1996_060_en.html. The current European
Commissioner for Competition Policy, Mario Monti, while confirming support for a WTO approach, has also
demonstrated appreciation for the recent U.S. proposal to adopt a Global Competition Forum, calling it "[a]
tool that will help [competition authorities] provide a response to requests for more coherence, more
coordination, more governance in international competition policy." Mario Monti, The EU Views on Global
Competition Forum (Speech Given at ABA Meetings, Mar. 29, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt-gt&doc=SPEECH/OI/147101RAPID&Ig=EN.
71. The WTO Panel, in the Kodak-Fujii case, confirmed the principle that WTO rules apply solely to
measures adopted by governments. The case established that private anticompetitive practices would only be
relevant in those rare cases in which a causal link can be established between such practices and measures
actually adopted by the governments. Moreover, WTO members are under no commitment to adopt or
enforce competition laws. See WTO, The Relevance of WTO Principles ofNational Treatment, Transparency
and Most-favored Nation Treatment to Competition Policy and Vice-versa, WT/WGTCP/W/ 115 (Apr. 12,
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that case, the U.S. Government was unable to obtain a favorable panel report
against Japan after arguing that Japan had violated WTO rules by not
exercising antitrust jurisdiction against exclusionary conduct by Fuji. However,
divergences between the U.S. position and that of the EU began well before the
Panel report in this WTO case.72
Thus, more convincing reasons can be found in an analysis of the legal and
strategic international scenario. The United States and the EU are not only the
main economic players, but also the bearers of the two leading models of
antitrust law. These models present a number of differences related to
economic and historical elements. Some differences in the structure of the
relationships between central authorities (the European Commission and the
DOJ and FTC, respectively) and local authorities (national and state antitrust
laws, respectively) are determined mainly by the different forms of federalism
present in the United States and in the European Union. In addition, a number
of substantive differences exist as a result of jurisprudential decisions and
legislative developments.
A first major difference between the United States and the European Union
is the variety of subjects involved in antitrust enforcement. Private litigation
accounts for the majority of U.S. antitrust cases73 and, even when the antitrust
authorities are involved, they intervene as parties in a trial directed by an
impartial judge. When the agencies challenge a merger, they still have to
obtain a court decision blocking the merger, while in the European Union the
Commission decision is already binding, and the parties can subsequently
appeal it to the Courts. In the latter case, the time necessary for a decision is
such that the deal is abandoned anyway In the European Union, the
Commission has centralized power to initiate and conduct investigations. Its
decisions can be appealed to the Court of First Instance and, subsequently, to
the European Court of Justice.74 Although private entities can invoke EU
1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/pdf/wto-compOl.pdf. This can also be seen as a sign of
the inadequacy of a multilateral approach to antitrust enforcement or as an additional reason for adding to
WTO binding rules in the field of antitrust.
72. As mentioned in supra Part I, the Commission first presented its proposal for a WTO approach in
1996, while diverging views with U.S. authorities have existed since the mid-1990s.
73. Statistics show that about 90% of the antitrust cases in the United States are generated by private
litigation. Two powerful tools in encouraging this trend are the treble damages rule and the possibility of class
actions, both of which are not available in the EU system.
74. At a national level, all Member States have a national antitrust law and authority that deals with
anticompetitive practices and concentrations affecting domestic markets. While some antitrust laws prescribe
that when the Commission opens an investigation, the national authority refrains from continuing its own
investigation, EU law forbids the simultaneous application of national and EU antitrust rules only for
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antitrust violations in civil litigation in front of national judges, most of the
cases are prosecuted by the Commission or by national antitrust authorities.7 5
The remedies available in the two jurisdictions also differ. In the United
States, antitrust cases are not only heard by an impartial judge, but they can also
involve criminal sanctions and they are characterized by incentives to private
action, such as the treble damages rule and class actions. In the European
Union, antitrust proceedings are administrative proceedings conducted by the
Commission or the antitrust authorities, and lead to restraint orders and fines.76
Private parties can only forward their complaints to the Commission, which
maintains discretionary power on whether to start a proceeding.
Even the methods of analysis and the characterization of certain practices
differ significantly. The dichotomy in the United States between the per se
analysis and the rule of reason analysis is well known. In the European Union,
adoption of the de minimis principle77 has demonstrated a preference for an
analysis closer to the rule of reason approach. U.S. antitrust enforcement
traditionally has been less hostile to certain practices, such as vertical
agreements.78 Also, the notion of monopolization forbidden by the Sherman
concentrations. The Commission is considering the option of strengthening decentralized application of EU
antitrust law (i.e., applications by the national Authorities). See Commission White Paper on Modernization
of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 1999 O.J. (C 132) 1. In furtherance of the
White Paper, in September of 2000 the Commission proposed a new Council Regulation on the
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. See Proposal for a
Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty and Amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC)
No 3975/87, COM(2000) 582 final.
75. The Commission, in furthering of its goal of concentrating on the cases most harmful to the Common
Market and consumers, has recently advocated the necessity to further develop private enforcement of
antitrust rules in Europe. See Mario Monti, Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, (Speech
Given at Sixth EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, June 1, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxtgt&doc=S-PEECH/01/258101RAPID&Ig=EN.
76. Ifappealing from the antitrust authority's final decision, investigated parties have the opportunity fora
hearing in front of an impartial judge.
77. The origins of this principle lie in the Volk judgment of July 9, 1969, in which the ECJ decided that an
agreement escaped the prohibition of former article 85 (now article 81) if, because of the weakness of the
parties on the market, the agreement did not appreciably distort the market. Case 5/69, Volk v. ETS, 1969
E.C.R. 295, [1969] C.M.L.R. 273 (1969). The Commission, beginning in 1970, developed this principle in a
number of notices. The Commission issued the latest version in 2001. See Commission Notice on
Agreements of Minor Importance Which do not Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 81(1) of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (de minimis), 2001 O.J. (C 368) 13.
78. In the United States, vertical agreements were forbidden only when considered unreasonable from the
economic point of view. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Silvanya Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). However,
traditionally in Europe vertical agreements were almost systematically forbidden when reaching EU relevance.
See Green Paper, The Vertical Restraints in EU Competition Policy,
http://europa.eu.int/en/record/green/gp9701/vertical.htm. The main reason behind this difference was that the
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Act differs from the abuse of dominant position forbidden by article 82 [former
article 86] of the Treaty of Rome.79
Finally, differences also exist with regard to merger control in the United
States and the European Union, both as to the kind of mergers that trigger the
notification obligations and the ways in which the relevant authorities proceed
in their analyses. The thresholds, the tests for clearance, the treatment of
foreign mergers, and certain procedural differences differentiate the two
80
regulatory regimes.
C. The Global Influence of the U.S. and the EU Models ofAntitrust
Law
The influence of the U.S. and EU models of antitrust law expanded
differently in the last decade. The EU influences the area surrounding its
borders, including those countries that might directly or indirectly enter its
economic area through access to a larger Free Trade Area, to the Economic
Community, or to the Union itself.81 For instance, for the former communist
rationale of European competition law was not limited to consumer welfare but also included integration
within the Common Market. Under this rationale, vertical agreements were considered particularly dangerous
due to their capacity to fragment the European Market into national areas. However, the European
Commission is modifying its approach to vertical agreements, mainly on the basis that the European Common
Market is today a solid reality; therefore, more space can be allowed for economic analysis of consumers'
welfare. Thus, some categories of vertical agreements have been exempted under article 81(3). See
Commission Regulation 2790/1999 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories ofVertical
Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21.
79. The concept of monopolization is conceptually wider than the concept of abuse of dominant position, as
it could allow forbidding the acquisition of a dominant position, even when not through abusive means. For a
more detailed analysis of the difference between EU abuse of dominance and U.S. monopolization, see Per
Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals andDominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition
Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 443 (1996); Elenore M. Fox, Monopolization
and Dominance in the United States and the European Community--Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 981 (1986).
80. For an updated vision, see GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER
CONTROL (2001). For additional analysis of the differences between the European and American models, see
Griffin, supra, note 5; B. E. Hawk & L. Laudati, Federalismo ntitrust negli Stati Uniti e decentramento
nell 'applicazione del diritto della concorrenza nell'Unione Europea: un esame comparativo, in LA TUTELA
DELLA CONCORRENZA: REGOLE, ISTITUZIONE E RAPPORT! INTERNAZIONALI (Autorit& Garante della
Concorrenza e del Mercato, Rome 1996); PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT IN EC AND US COMPETITION
LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEIDEN EUROPA INSTITUT SEMINAR ON USER-FRIENDLY COMPETITION LAW
(Piet Jan Slot & Alison McDonnell eds., 1994); Sabrina Haake, Antitrust in the United States and European
Community. Towarda BilateralAgreement, 2 IND. INT'L & COMP. L REv. 473 (1992); MAARIO MARQUES
MENDES, ANTITRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRELATED ECONOMIES: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ANTITRUST
AND TRADE POLICIES IN THE US AND THE EEC (1991).
81. Among the countries in the area surrounding the Union, there is no homogeneity regarding the degree
of perspective integration into the Union. While some of those countries are already in a relatively advanced
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countries of Eastern Europe, the adoption of legislation based on EU antitrust
law has been determined not only by the need to update the internal legal
system to the new market economies, but by the fact that such adoption was a
prerequisite for their application to membership.82
The U.S. model has a more global reach. Germany and Japan were forced
to adopt U.S.-like antitrust laws after the Second World War to eliminate the
concentration of powers that had supported military expansion in these two
countries. American experts are routinely hired, particularly in Asia and Latin
America, by countries wishing to adopt new antitrust legislation.83 Because of
their background, those experts normally propose legislation strongly
influenced by the American model. The United States, like the EU, also
exercises a strong influence on contiguous countries, thus inducing them to
develop compatible antitrust legislation. Finally, the United States, because of
its economic dominance, is normally in a position of strength when dealing
bilaterally with other countries. As a result, it is often able, by diplomatic
action and economic pressure, to impose its own juridical and economic models
or at least to heavily influence pre-existing models.
84
Strategic interests might motivate the different approaches to international
antitrust enforcement pursued in the 1990s by the EU and the United States.
The EU might have been interested in early negotiation in the WTO forum,
where the economic and cultural predominance of the United States could be
diluted and balanced. On the other hand, in the years preceding WTO
negotiations, the United States might have opted for taking strategic advantage
of its overwhelming dominance through bilateral dealings, in which it could
stage of discussion for possible access to the Union (for instance, Poland, Slovenia, or Hungary), other
countries, for economic or political reasons pursue milder degrees of associations.
82. The so-called "Europe Agreements," entered between the European Community and each single state,
routinely provided: (1) An obligation on the East European Associate to implement competition rules
coherent with the E.C. apparatus, and (2) some forms of cooperation with the European Commission. Karel
Van Miert, Competition Policy in Relation to the Central and Eastern European Countries-Achievements
and Challenges, COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL., June 1998, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_019_en.html. The result has been that most of
those countries adopted competition laws in the 1990s: Poland and Hungary in 1990; the Czech Republic,
Latvia, and Kazakhstan in 1993; the Slovak Republic in 1994; Albania in 1995; Georgia and Romania in
1996. M. R. A. Palim, The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical Analysis, ANTITRUST
BULL., Mar. 22, 1998. Other eastern European countries that adopted an antitrust law in very recent years are
Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
83. A discussion about the export of U.S. antitrust law worldwide and related issues can be found in J.
Thomas Rosch et al., 60 Minutes with the Honorable James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 60 ANTITRUST L. J. 217 (1991).
84. Nicola Verola, I1 Commercio Come Leva Geopolitica, LIMES, 1996, at 153.
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more easily impose its models and interests, only entering the multilateral arena
when the environment had been already altered in favor of U.S. models.8 5
Divergent positions on international antitrust enforcement are also found
within states. The most prominent example is provided by the United States,
where in the late 1990s the interest of the Clinton administration in WTO
negotiations on common antitrust principles contrasted with the extremely
skeptical approach of the DOJ.86 It is plausible to interpret such divergence as
an attempt by the relevant antitrust authority not only to favor the national
interest, but also to retain the concrete exercise of sovereignty that the adoption
of principles and procedures within the WTO might return to the central power
of governments. Conversely, the fact that in Europe the approach to
international antitrust enforcement has been univocal derives from the
circumstance that the application of competition law and the exercise of
governing functions are to a large extent concentrated in the same institution,
thus creating no alternative centers of power in this regard. As a matter of fact,
EU national governments tend to completely delegate governance over
international competition issues to EU institutions.8 7
IV. CONCLUSION: REASONS FOR SUPPORTING THE ADOPTION OF A
MULTILATERAL ANTITRUST AGREEMENT FROM THE WTO
In the course of this paper, governance issues and legal responses for
international antitrust enforcement have been outlined. This has permitted a
better understanding of the interests relevant to the bilateral and multilateral
approaches to international antitrust enforcement. Attention has been paid to
exposing why the interaction between the legal, structural, and political levels
have at times resulted in friction and divergent positions between and within
countries. This final section will consider the merits of pursuing a multilateral
agreement within the WTO, as discussed by governments at Doha.
85. Similar strategies have already proven successful, as seen in the process that resulted in the adoption of
the TRIPs side agreement to the WTO.
86. Joel Klein, former Assistant US Attorney General, stated at a June 1999 OECD conference in Paris that
if adopted within the WTO "antitrust rules would be useless, pernicious, or both, and would serve only to
politicize the long-term future of international antitrust enforcement, including through the intrusion of trade
disputes disguised as antitrust problems." See EUROPEAN REPORT, July 7, 1999.
87. Such circumstance, which is evident in everyday practice and chronicles was confirmed in the Annual
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Fordhan University, 1998) (presented by the President
of a European national antitrust authority).
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While some success has been achieved through bilateral agreements, the
increasing globalization and proliferation of antitrust laws make the adoption of
multilateral rules necessary. The WTO is particularly well equipped for
reaching this goal. The WTO has already developed the expertise necessary to
perform this task, and it has an effective enforcement mechanism to ensure that
states comply with a treaty on antitrust rules.
From the point of view of sovereignty structures, while antitrust authorities
exercise their functions autonomously, this does not mean that governments and
parliaments are being deprived of their sovereignty. An increasing degree of
autonomy was necessary to address the challenges of antitrust enforcement in a
globalized world, However, governments and parliaments retain their
sovereignty and can at any time re-centralize enforcement activities. With the
adoption of general WTO rules, the executive branches would frame the
principles of antitrust control, leaving implementation of these principles to
national authorities, which are more competent and better equipped. If the
WTO approach is abandoned, a lack of clarity will persist, due to international
issues being left to the discretionary action of antitrust authorities. This could
compromise the effectiveness of public antitrust enforcement by leading to
contradictions between and within systems.
Conversely, a multilateral framework of rules developed by governments
within the WTO would allow governments to regain leadership in shaping
international antitrust policies. Governments have a broader view than antitrust
authorities, which institutionally should be concerned only with antitrust
enforcement, and can thus better understand the limits and utility of the
adoption of common principles and procedures. Moreover, a multilateral
agreement could include provisions on cooperation, thus laying the groundwork
for further cooperation between national antitrust authorities.
With the new millennium, rivalry between the U.S. and the EU models of
antitrust law has apparently diminished, in favor of a movement toward
harmonization or coordination. The EU reform of competition law increases
the emphasis on economic analysis. Even in an area of major divergence such
as vertical agreements, the two systems are more consistent after the adoption
of the 1999 block exemption on vertical restraints by the European
Commission.88 Following issuance of the ICPAC report in 2000, the United
States has increased its interest in multilateral approaches, proposing the
88. Commission Regulation No. 2790/1999, [1999] L 336 21.
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institution of a new forum for coordination within a wider global initiative.
Finally, consensus was reached on taking the issue into the WTO. The
adoption of a WTO agreement will allow the U.S. and the EU antitrust models
to achieve more common ground, and will facilitate a balanced approach to
multijurisdictional cases. A supranational set of rules will also discourage any
temptation to unfairly assist-directly or through interaction--domestic players
when enforcing antitrust laws.
In brief, adoption of a framework of competition rules from the WTO is
highly desirable. The range of solutions developed in such an arena could vary
from the adoption of general "cosmopolitan" principles, 8 9 to the adoption of a
set of basic substantive rules, binding for all WTO members.90 The main areas
outlined in the 2001 Doha Declaration include a set of core principles, such as
transparency, non-discrimination, procedural fairness, and rules on hard-core
cartels. These are complemented by modalities for voluntary cooperation and
support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing
countries through skills building.91 The EU proposal also to consider general
rules for cooperation 92 has been incorporated into the Declaration. The
adoption of a framework of rules agreed to by governments would both expand
the scope for cooperation and increase clarity in the exercise of sovereignty.
The approach pursued within the WTO has the potential to benefit both the
multilateral and the bilateral approaches to international antitrust enforcement,
thus allowing states to cope at different levels with the challenges posed by the
globalization of antitrust enforcement.
89. This proposal was advanced in Eleanor M. Fox, InternationalAntitrust: Against Minimum Rules for
Cosmopolitan Principles, ANTITRUST BULL., Mar. 22, 1998. Fox criticizes both the feasibility and the
convenience of an attempt to introduce homogeneous substantive rules through the WTO.
90. Many commentators believe that a set of rules could include provisions on hard-core cartels and
strengthen compliance with the WTO principles of transparency and non-discrimination in the field of
antitrust. Taking those issues in the WTO forum was also considered a viable option in INT'L COMPETITION
POL'Y ADVISORY COMM. TO THE ATT'Y GEN. & ASST. ATT'Y GEN. FOR ANTITRUST (ICPAC), FINAL REPORT
(Feb. 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/cover.pdf.
91. See Doha Declaration, supra note 39, at paras. 23-25.
92. European Commission, Approaches to Promoting Co-operation and Communication among WTO
Members, Including in the Field of Technical Cooperation, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/compet.

